Capability outran control
Tool connectors scaled faster than runtime admission for high-impact actions.
AINav sits between the agent and the effect. It allows, denies, or escalates under human authority—before anything irreversible lands—with request-bound approval and a clear decision record.
RAG grounds answers. IAM gates people. Logs explain the past. AINav decides whether an agent action may proceed now.
The gap
Teams are moving past chat into workflows that call tools, change state, and trigger external effects. Enterprise copilots and knowledge bots help with drafting and retrieval. They do not answer the institutional question when an agent proposes something privileged.
May this action proceed—under whose authority—with what evidence—before anything irreversible happens?
Tool connectors scaled faster than runtime admission for high-impact actions.
Logs and SIEM matter. They do not stop a privileged effect while it is still pending.
Open-ended agent authority is fragile. Approvals should bind to one request—and die after use or time.
Product
AINav does not replace your models, identity provider, or execution systems. It admits privileged actions: allow, deny, or escalate—then records what was decided.
Closed decision vocabulary at runtime under policy and system mode.
Sensitive actions wait for a human. Nothing privileged proceeds on silence.
Authority attaches to what was approved—not to whatever the agent sends next.
A successful allow consumes the ticket. Replay does not inherit consent.
Institutional stop can deny privileged classes even after a prior approval.
What was proposed, decided, and under what authority—correlated for review.
How it works
Example paths
Illustrative behaviors—not a public test catalog. In evaluation, scenarios are exercised as reproducible pass/fail outcomes under commercial process.
Policy can allow research-style actions without human escalation—so the control plane does not bottleneck ordinary retrieval.
High-impact proposals do not auto-execute. The effect stays blocked until approve, deny, or expiry.
After human approve, only a matching follow-up may proceed. A changed payload does not inherit consent.
Replaying the same approval does not authorize a second effect.
When the plane is in a fail-closed stop mode, privileged classes can be denied even if a ticket was previously issued.
What is not explicitly allowed or escalated is denied—not silently executed.
Positioning
May this agent action proceed right now? Adjacent tools answer different questions.
| Approach | Answers | Does not |
|---|---|---|
| Logs / SIEM | What already happened | Stop a pending privileged effect |
| IAM / PAM | Who a human is; what they can access | Admit agent-proposed tool calls at runtime |
| RAG / knowledge bots | What company documents say | Authorize or block side effects |
| Generic policy engines | Whether a rule matches | Always productize escalate + request-bound approval |
| AINav | Allow / deny / escalate before effect | Replace your model, cloud, or OMS |
Who it’s for
If the workflow only drafts text, you may not need a control plane yet. If agents can move money, change limits, alter access, or trigger external actions, you do.
Keep halt and human-approval semantics on agent-proposed privileged steps—not only on human consoles.
Default deny, request-bound approval, and decision evidence when agents hold tool credentials.
Who proposed, who decided, what was approved—before irreversible effects land.
Evaluate
Pilots are time-boxed software evaluations—measured in weeks, not open-ended programs. Synthetic scenarios first. No live production authority implied by a successful evaluation.
Principles
Uncertainty should not become silent allow on privileged actions.
Agents should not hold standing authority for sensitive effects.
Sensitive actions can require a person—not only a model score.
Approvals can expire and bind to a specific request.
Decisions should be reconstructable after the fact.
Evaluate behavior before connecting production systems.
Architecture detail and security questionnaires are handled under commercial discussion—not as a public how-to.
FAQ
No. AINav builds and licenses enterprise software—a runtime control plane for privileged AI agent actions—not staffing or general implementation services.
No. AINav governs privileged action paths. You keep your models, clouds, and execution systems.
RAG grounds answers in your documents. AINav decides whether a privileged agent action may proceed—allow, deny, or escalate—before the effect lands. Knowledge grounding and action admission are different control problems.
IAM and PAM primarily govern human identity and access. Logs record what already happened. AINav decides whether a privileged agent action may proceed—under human authority—before the effect lands, with a reviewable decision record.
No. Evaluation is synthetic-first. You can exercise the authority loop without production data, credentials, or live effect paths.
A time-boxed evaluation of the authority loop on synthetic scenarios: allow, deny, escalate, fail-closed stop, request-bound approval, and decision records. It does not authorize live production effects or imply firm-wide deployment.
Enterprise software for runtime admission of privileged agent actions, accessed through pilot briefings and commercial licensing—not GPU capacity, staff augmentation, or general AI project delivery.
Company
AINav is a United States software product company. We build the AINav control plane and operate under the brand AINav.Institute. Commercial motion: software evaluation and licensing.
Contact
Tell us who you are and which privileged agent actions you are evaluating. We respond from our company inbox. No production data required to start.
Email
pilots@ainav.institute
Include name, company, role, and the actions you’re evaluating.
A focused discussion of the authority loop: allow, deny, escalate, fail-closed stop, request-bound approval, and synthetic evaluation.
No production connectivity required. No obligation to deploy firm-wide.
AINav · ainav.institute